The use of chloroform during the Crimean War was determined by the opinions and experience of medical staff and by the availability of chloroform on the battlefields and in the military hospitals. This paper will begin by reviewing medical opinion on the value of chloroform in military surgery at the start of the war, and after examining the availability and use of chloroform during the war, it will conclude with an examination of medical opinion at the end of the war. A brief chronology of the major military events is given in Table 1 .
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The use of chloroform during the Crimean War was determined by the opinions and experience of medical staff and by the availability of chloroform on the battlefields and in the military hospitals. This paper will begin by reviewing medical opinion on the value of chloroform in military surgery at the start of the war, and after examining the availability and use of chloroform during the war, it will conclude with an examination of medical opinion at the end of the war. A brief chronology of the major military events is given in Table 1 .
Medical Opinion in the Army at the Start of the War
On 12 May 1847, less than six months after the arrival of anaesthesia in Britain, John Snow delivered a lecture on the use of ether in surgical operations to the medical members of the United Services Institution.1 In this lecture Snow, with his characteristic insight, foresaw many of the potential benefits of anaesthesia in military practice. Some of these, which were later to be realized during the Crimean War, have been italicized in the following quotations from Snow's paper. He argued that . . . the pain of a surgical operation is greater than that of the wound itself. Whilst the latter is instantaneous, and its approach unknown, the approach of an operation is seen, and its cuts are necessarily deliberate; ... The blessing would be great of merely preventing this pain, but I am firmly convinced that the exhibition of ether will be attended with the still greater advantage of saving many lives. A great part of the danger of an operation consists in the pain of it, which gives a shock to the system from which it is sometimes unable to recover. If an operation is performed during or immediately after an action, the wounded man suffers two shocks together-that of his wound and that of the operation, which although, singly, his frame might sustain, united, perhaps it cannot. If, on the other hand, a secondary operation, as it is called, has to be performed sometime Centre, for assistance in locating some of the references, and to Pat Rossi for typing the manuscript. I thank the Governors of the Hereford Postgraduate Medical Centre for a Bursary which contributed to the costs of the research. Anyone researching the medical history of the Crimean War owes an immense debt to the pioneering work of the late Mr John Shepherd. in the Indian Medical Service, who wrote following an action: "After attending my own wounded, I proceeded to those of the enemy, and out of these 49 cases, I had 18 amputations to perform, all under the influence of chloroform; and, with the exception of 3 cases ... every man recovered".3 Further extensive research by Shepherd did not reveal any other references to use of anaesthesia by British army surgeons before 1854.4
Although there appears to have been little experience of military anaesthesia in the British army, in Russia Nikolai Pirogov had used ether extensively and successfully during the Caucasus campaign of 1847.5 He reported his results on several occasions between 1847 and 1852, but it is perhaps unlikely that British doctors would have been aware of reports in Russian language publications. They would, however, have known of the opinions of Parisian surgeons during the riots and insurrection in that city in 1848, even if they did not read French journals, because translations of the surgeons' experiences were reported in the Lancet. Jules Roux was said to have used chloroform seven times in wounded patients "without the least unpleasant symptom",6 but Alfred Velpeau thought that as "chloroform evidently depresses the nervous system, and as great prostration always exists in patients who have received gunshot wounds, it is advisable to refrain from any anaesthetic means".7 Dr Charles Kidd, who was in Paris at the time, commented that "anaesthetic agents have, in almost every instance, proved highly safe and useful", and, though he also noted that mortality after amputation was twice what it had been in the Peninsular War, he attributed this to the facts that the Parisian hospitals were overwhelmed by the immensely high casualty rate and that several hospitals were themselves under siege.8 Writing after the war, Kidd claimed that further evidence for the benefits of chloroform in military surgery had been provided by its use during the Russian invasion of Hungary and in the annexation of the Punjab in 1849,9 but references to support these claims have not been found.
Immediately before the British army's embarkation, at Varna in Bulgaria, for the Crimea, Dr John Hall, the Principal Medical Officer, issued a 'Memorandum for the information of Medical Officers taking the field for active service'.10 It was this memorandum which contained Hall's much quoted caution against the use of chloroform:
Dr Hall takes this opportunity of cautioning medical officers against the use of chloroform in the severe shock of serious gunshot wounds, as he thinks few will survive where it is used. But as public opinion, founded perhaps on mistaken philanthropy, he knows is against him, he can only caution medical officers, and entreat that they will watch its effects; for however barbarous it may appear, the smart of the knife is a powerful stimulant; and it is much better to hear a man bawl lustily than to see him sink silently into the grave.
On 23 September 1854, the Illustrated London News published in full the 'Instructions to troops' in the invading army, which included Hall's memorandum. Some three weeks later, after the furore caused by the inadequate arrangements for the care of the wounded at the battle of the Alma and their transport to Scutari had already been vented in the press, a fierce argument broke out in The Times concerning Hall's advice on chloroform. On 12 October, the newspaper published a letter from James Syme who wrote:
... it seems requisite to state, as a result of long and ample experience in opposition to what Dr Hall "thinks" on the subject, that chloroform does not increase the danger of operations performed during a state of exhaustion, however extreme; that pain, instead of being a "powerful stimulant", most injuriously exhausts the nervous energy of a weak patient; and that, therefore, so long as the safety of the operation may be in question, chloroform proves useful directly in proportion to the severity of the injury or disease and the degree of exhaustion or shock.'1 There was an immediate response when, on the next day, a letter appeared from a correspondent who signed himself "A Military Surgeon":
Chloroform is a powerful depressant of vital action. Yesterday at University College Hospital another victim fell sacrifice to it; and it is cheering to know that, at several of the London hospitals, the perfectly safe practice of benumbing the part with cold, previously to its incision, is now being substituted for chloroform in a large class of operations.12 Such opinions were not confined to military surgeons. In the same month Dr James Arnott published detailed 'Instructions for using benumbing cold in operations'13 and a few months later Thomas Wakley Junior wrote a letter to his father's journal confirming Arnott's results. 14 This letter was also noticed by the lay press,15 which suggests that there must have been public interest in safer alternatives to chloroform at this time. However, the majority opinion in favour of chloroform was reflected in a leading article entitled 'Chloroform on the battlefield' in the Association (subsequently British) Medical Journal. The editor noted that Dr Hall's opinion was "opposed to our observation on the effects of chloroform in civil practice", and cited, in support of his argument, "the statistics of the results of amputations under anaesthesia, collected by Dr Simpson a few years ago".'6 James Young Simpson's study in fact related to amputations under ether, rather than chloroform, and was not, by modern standards, an adequately controlled trial. It It is also known that some surgeons took their own supplies of chloroform with them. One of these was Dr R J Mackenzie, a civilian volunteer attached to the 79th Regiment. How much chloroform he had is not known, but he probably carried very little because "we are all to carry our kits. I weighed mine yesterday, and between knapsack, haversack, rations, etc, I shall have within a few ounces of 50 lbs on my back!" Mackenzie died of cholera shortly after the battle of the Alma and his obituary recorded that "in addition to extracting numerous balls, and dressing a multitude of wounds, he performed 27 capital operations".54 It seems improbable that his own private supply of chloroform would have been adequate for this workload. Like other surgeons he was probably "borrowing from another's small pannier stock when he could ill spare the loan. There was no general canteen for general purposes". 55 The official medical history of the war stated that "On the field at Alma, it [chloroform] was largely employed".56 However, the information on the availability of chloroform at regimental level tends to corroborate the opinion of a surgeon on the battlefield that "the supply of chloroform was most limited",57 and W G Watt, the surgeon to the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers, which had suffered 51 killed and 157 wounded, reported that "After the battle of Alma . . . I was also unable to procure a proper supply of chloroform, the divisional supply having been exhausted, and I could not procure it from the general hospital".58
Following the battle, the majority of the wounded were transferred by boat from Balaklava to the hospitals in Scutari. Of the eleven transport ships used at this time, only five had been issued with chloroform by the Dispenser in charge at Balaklava (Table 5 ). The Andes received no chloroform at Balaklava, but had been equipped as a hospital ship at Vama in August 1854, when 2 lbs of chloroform were supplied.59 However, according to Shepherd, when the Andes reached the Crimea the master denied that there were any medical stores on board,60 though Dr John Tice, who was her senior surgeon when she left Balaklava on 22 September, reported that he "found everything requisite in the shape of medicine, comforts, instruments, appliances", and he described the supply of medicines as "ample", the supply of surgical instruments as "'sufficient for every purpose", and the supply of materials and appliances as "abundant"..61 Victor Bonham-Carter quotes, without giving the archive reference, from the papers of John Hall, who painted a very different picture.
The Andes and Cambria were told off by Admiral Boxer as Hospital Ships and were equipped at Vama for that purpose in August 1854 ... They were ill calculated for the service they were intended for, and the Captain of the Andes was a drunken ill-conditioned man and subsequently occasioned much embarrassment by trans-shipping the stores to another vessel-without giving notice or 54 written by the same surgeon as the author stated that he had written a previous letter, and the items mentioned as being plentiful are so similar. Shepherd suggests that the author was Assistant-Surgeon John Wyatt of the Coldstream Guards who also noted in his regimental report that "Chloroform, with two exceptions, was employed in every case".89 However, E M Wrench, who arrived in the Crimea a few days after the great storm of 14 November 1854, commented that
The older surgeons had a great dread of (the then recently invented) chloroform, fostered by the historical memorandum from the Director-General almost forbidding its use ... We therefore only used chloroform for the more serious operations, and never to facilitate examination, or for what we consider trivial operations, as cutting out bullets or setting compound fractures.90
After the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman the more seriously injured were again transferred tof Scutari. In comparison with the critical reports of the transfer of those wounded at the Alma, there appears to have been' relatively little complaint about conditions on the transport ships after these later battles. Information about supplies of chloroform on the transports at this time is shown in Table 6 . The Talavera and the Andes carried, between them, about 400 wounded but no chloroform. Assuming an amputation rate of 5 per cent among the wounded and 2 oz of chloroform for each anaesthetic,91 then the supplies of chloroform on the remaining ships were probably adequate, especially as it is likely that some of the wounded had had their operations before embarking.
Hall and his staff were still experiencing difficulties in equipping the transport ships in December 1854 and January 1855. In a letter to the Quartermaster General written on 18 January 1855,92 in response to a complaint about a lack of medical supplies on the Joseph Sheppard, which had sailed from Balaklava on 12 December,93 Hall wrote: "So long as numerous transports have to be fitted up at a few hours notice for the reception of the sick, from limited stores, articles will occasionally run short, or be altogether wanting, but every effort is made to obviate this as much as possible". In the circumstances, it is probably not surprising that some ships sailed with no chloroform on board.
The supplies of chloroform listed in Tables 5 and 6 for ships sailing between 22-30 September, and 26 October and 11 November, after the major battles, total 7 lbs 5 oz. This accords reasonably well with the total of 11 lbs 1 oz which Dispenser Kersey issued to the "hospital ships" from the store in Balaklava from the end of October to 31 December
1854.94
The Availability The difficulties of using chloroform in the field at the time of a great battle were described by an artillery surgeon who was present at Inkerman:
I hear there is a great cry against our not using chloroform; but, the more I see, the more strongly am I convinced that it is not of much value in the field; it reduces the number of medical men available for duty. It would be simply murder to leave the administration to any but educated hands, and seldom can you get more than one doctor to assist at an operation; for instance, I had to amputate a leg and an arm, with only my own servant as an assistant; and how many others have had to operate under even more unfavourable circumstances, I cannot say, but they were many.... London, wrote to Hall in the Crimea to express his concern about the total lack of quinine and the small stocks of chloroform available at Balaklava on 5 March: I earnestly request you will take care to prevent your stock of medicines getting so low as it appears to have been on the 5th ultimo, as under the present circumstances of the troops a much larger supply ought always to be available for issue, and I cannot believe it possible that any difflculty can exist in maintaining such a supply, as the quantities of every article at Scutari must be very large.
Operating in
The total want of quinine and the small amount of chloroform which you return in store especially attracted my attention, and care must be taken to avoid the necessity of having to make such confessions in future. You may rest assured the public will not lose this opportunity of holding up the department to further obloquy; but even were there no reason to fear that, it must be kept in mind that nothing but the absolute inability of securing the articles could warrant such a want of them. 109 By the end of March 1855 the stocks of chloroform at Balaklava amounted to 41 lbs 6 oz and on 27 April Smith wrote again to Hall to express his ... great satisfaction ... that the medical supplies are now abundant, and I trust that there will never again be any deficiency, either in regimental hospitals or the divisional, or in the central store attached to the army, but that an arrangement shall be made, and strictly carried out, whereby medical stores far in advance of any possible demand shall be forwarded on your requisition from the medical depot at Scutari, at which station a superabundance will always be found.110
Smith must have hoped that the adverse publicity resulting from a lack of medical supplies would now be a thing of the past, but barely more than two weeks later he had to deal with a complaint that there was now a "total lack of quinine in the camp hospitals in 107 Anon., ' The Validity of the Data in Table 7 The discussion and conclusions in the previous sections depend heavily on the validity of the data in Table 7 , which is derived from statistical returns in the private papers of John Hall. The information on amputations in these statistical returns differs from that given elsewhere in the Hall papers (Table 8) , and from that given in the official medical history of the war,123 in several respects. First, the data given in the official history are limited to the period from 1 April 1855 to "the end of the war", apparently on the grounds that reliable information on the numbers of amputations before April 1855 was not available. Even when allowance is made for this (source 2 in Table 8 doctors, but it is not known how many others attended these meetings without expressing an opinion or having it recorded. Some members may have refrained from speaking out if their views conflicted with those of Hall, who chaired three of the four meetings, and who, although he had been heavily criticized during the war, was still a man of considerable influence within the Army Medical Service. The authors of the official history were determined to counter the allegations of brutality which had been levelled against the Army Medical Service in general as a result of Hall's original "caution" against the use of chloroform. In doing so, they may have over-emphasized the opinions of those who favoured the liberal use of anaesthesia. If the use of chloroform at the end of the war had fallen to the same level that it had been at the start was this because, despite its being readily available, surgeons had developed increasing doubts about its value or safety? It is evident that there was still a significant minority of surgeons who were reluctant to use anaesthesia, and they gave various reasons to substantiate their practice.
It was still argued that civilian experience was irrelevant to military practice, which differed in several important respects. For example, Mouat referred to the peaks in workload which followed a military engagement, pointing out, as had been argued at the start of the war,126 that in these circumstances the extra time required for anaesthetization and recovery, made it impossible to use chlorbform in every case.127 Mouat still considered that gunshot wounds were different from the wounds suffered in civilian practice, and that the shock associated with such wounds was likely to be aggravated by chloroform. In this context it must be remembered that, to the surgeons of the time, the term "shock" implied something more than just hypovolaemia due to blood loss. Shock, to the military surgeon is of a compound nature, in the composition of which the following elements may often be recognized:
1 This was one out of many untoward accidents that have occurred from the use of chloroform during the war. It proved more immediately fatal, and so attracted special attention; but if the cases where men never rallied, and died within a few hours after its exhibition, were as accurately detailed, the list would be a long one. But as I have already incurred much public odium for a wellintentioned, but carelessly worded caution, I am not going to re-open the question, only I feel authorised in saying that I have seen much to confirm the propriety of that caution, and all candid and unprejudiced men, I rather think, will admit the same.131 Mouat seems to have concurred with Hall's opinions in every respect when he addressed the Crimean Medical and Surgical Society. He concluded: "1. That there are states of shock ... in which chloroform may destroy life in various ways. 2. There are likewise cases in which, as I have stated, the patient never fairly rallies, but sinks gradually without any effort at reaction; these cases are never returned as deaths from chloroform."132 In the discussion which followed Mouat's paper,133 Dr Gordon concurred with Mouat's views, and a similar opinion was expressed by an anonymous doctor quoted in the official medical history of the war: "My own impression, from what I have seen of the effects of the drug, is that many of these cases died from the exhaustion induced by the shock of the injury and the consequent operation, but that this exhaustion was assisted and kept up in a most material degree by the depressing influence of the chloroform".134
However, of the sixteen doctors who attended and spoke at meetings of the Crimean Medical and Surgical Society,135 only four (Hall, Mouat, Gordon and Wyatt) believed that chloroform impaired the patient's ability to rally. Of the remaining twelve, ten were generally in favour of chloroform and three (Macleod, Bone and George Blenkins) specifically expressed the view that it actually minimized the effects of shock, improving survival and enabling some operations which could not otherwise have been undertaken. Similar opinions were voiced by others. J H McCowan described an amputation through the neck of the femur which "could not have been performed without an anaesthetic, with any prospect of the patient surviving the shock",136 and another surgeon, quoted anonymously in the official report, wrote, "I am of the opinion that the greater the shock the more useful is chloroform, and the sooner it can be resorted to the better", provided that "there was a rational hope of life being saved by the operation".137 Thomas Alexander recorded the case of a patient, quoted by Guthrie, "who was so low when placed on the table, that brandy-and-water was given to him, and he was then immediately placed under chloroform. When I had finished, it was found that his pulse was stronger than before commencing the operation",'38 which was for amputation at the shoulder. Such opinions on the "stimulant" effect of anaesthesia had certainly become the orthodox view in the USA by 1861.139
When considering the suggestion that chloroform impaired "rallying", it is relevant that the depth of anaesthesia which was sometimes used in the Crimea was considerable. Pyemont Smith wrote that: "Generally speaking, at Scutari, the patient was, by means of chloroform, brought into the condition of a dead body, and then it was not an operation, but a dissection that was performed",'40 and the Reverend Sydney Osborne described the difficulty in arousing one particular patient whom he had anaesthetized. 146 Simpson took a considerable personal interest in the medical aspects of the war. He arranged for both civilian and army medical officers to take out supplies of chloroform, and hoped that "you will be able to show them how to use it properly". Dr Dowson of the Guards incurred Simpson's wrath because he neither used, nor paid for, the case of chloroform which Simpson provided. Simpson also took a personal interest in the planning of the prefabricated hospital which was erected at Renkioi. J A Shepherd, Simpson and Syme of Edinburgh, Edinburgh and London, E and S Livingstone, 1969, pp. 116-20.
147 Hospitals report, op. cit., note 32 above, pp. 33-4.
March 1856,148 of these only two went to hospitals, the remainder being given to divisions or regiments.
The "more immediately fatal" case to which Hall referred occurred on 25 August 1855 and was described in detail. 149 The patient required amputation of his index finger and the chloroform, which "was administered with his own consent, as he seemed to dread the operation", was given on lint.
As the anaesthesia became more complete and the operation about to be commenced, it was observed that he did not breathe freely . . . The chloroform was immediately removed, but respiration could not be observed; a current of air was admitted and water dashed on the face, and ammonia held to the nostrils, but the pulse had ceased. Artificial respiration was had recourse to, and kept up for a long time, but without effect. The heart's action continued for some time after the pulse failed and respiration ceased.
The death was officially attributed to impurities in the chloroform, a sample of which was analysed some time later in Edinburgh and found to be "totally unfit for use, being in a state of complete decomposition". However, the nature of the incident, occurring in a frightened patient, soon after induction and before the operation began, is typical of the cardiac effects associated with chloroform when given in too great a concentration, as described by Snow. Although the case report stated that the chloroform was given in such a way "as to admit a large quantity of atmospheric air", Snow had realized that "the most fatal error with regard to chloroform has been to suppose that the patient was safe so long as he was supplied with sufficient air for the purposes of respiration; for the truth is, that the more air the patient breathes, the greater is his danger, if the air be over highly charged with the vapour".150 The statement in the case report that the "heart's action continued for some time after the pulse had failed" is not, of course, compatible with ventricular fibrillation due to chloroform because it presumably implies that heart sounds were heard after the pulse could no longer be felt. professional careers abroad and often in remote areas, many were frequent contributors to medical journals. Moreover, by the second half of the war, they must all have had many opportunities of witnessing anaesthesia at first hand and of learning the techniques from others, even if they had no previous practical experience. Concerns about the use of anaesthesia in the "shock" which followed severe gun-shot wounds, and of the risk-benefit ratio in more minor injuries, were matters of professional judgement which must also have exercised the minds of the French In the first half of the nineteenth century soldiers were expected to be able to withstand pain, and Pernick suggests that it was only in the mid-1850s that Anglo-American textbooks of surgery and medicine began to reject this notion and to suggest that soldiers merited anaesthesia on the same terms as did other men. Thus, during the war with Mexico (1846-1848) the chief surgeon of the American hospital at Vera Cruz claimed that chloroform was unnecessary on the field of battle, and he prevented a civilian surgeon from using chloroform in his hospital. 176 It is not possible to make similar comparisons between men and women using Snow's case records, because the nature of the non-dental anaesthetics is very different between the two sexes, and also because women had a greater number of teeth extracted under each anaesthetic (3.9 compared with 3.0).
What of the soldiers' own wishes as to whether they should be given anaesthesia? References to this subject in the Crimean War are scanty and anecdotal. In the case of the patient who died under anaesthesia the chloroform seems to have been given at the soldier's own express request,'77 and a correspondent to the Lancet mentioned that "many of the poor fellows were cunning enough to ask for chloroform".'78 Whether any of the patients refused chloroform is not recorded, although a few soldiers did so at the time of the second Anglo-Boer war nearly fifty years later.179
Medical Opinion in later Years
In 1875 Surgeon-Major Joshua Porter published The surgeon's pocket book-being an essay on the best treatment ofthe wounded in war. Porter had battlefield experience in the Crimea, during the Indian mutiny, and in the Franco-German war of 1870-71, and at the time of publishing his book was assistant professor of military surgery in the Army Medical School at Netley. It is therefore probable that his opinions were respected and represented orthodox thinking among the army surgeons of the time. Porter advised that, when possible, chloroform should be used for all operations, and even for dressing painful wounds. Among the usual precautions which should be observed when using chloroform he included the "wishes of the patient". Whether this was an injunction to any surgeons who did not routinely use chloroform to give it if it was requested by the patient, or whether it was meant to imply that chloroform should be omitted if the patient did not wish it, is not clear from the text. He stated categorically that chloroform "decidedly relieves the nervous shock" in recently wounded soldiers. So valuable was chloroform that it "and other anaesthetics should be most carefully treasured by the army surgeon and no waste allowed. It is sometimes difficult to procure it in sufficient quantity, especially after severe engagements, when every drop is worth its weight in gold".'80
During the Crimean War it would seem that chloroform was the only anaesthetic agent which was used,181 but Porter's mention of "other anaesthetics" implies that it was no longer the sole anaesthetic in use by the army in 1875. He goes on to say that he, himself, had frequently used ether and found it highly satisfactory. Ether had the reputation, especially among Americans, of being much safer than chloroform, but the greater volume required to produce anaesthesia and the necessity of carrying a bulky inhaler for its administration were disadvantages on active service. Porter suggested that it was a matter for debate as to whether these disadvantages should prevent its use in warfare, noting that, "our combatant brethren never hesitate to transport enormous implements of destruction!".
In 1878 the Surgeon General's Office in Simla published memoranda for the use of Medical Officers in the British Forces which included details of stocks of chloroform to be held at regimental and divisional levels (Table 10) . Regimental stocks were twice as 177 Medical and surgical history, op. cit., note 21
Charles Griffin, 1875, pp. 151-2.
above, pt 2, pp. 268-9. 181 The only mention of ether in either official 178 Anon., ' The war', Lancet, 1855, i: 22. records or in journal reports or books is of the 8 oz 179 B Hovell, 'Anaesthesia and the siege of in the stocks on board the Australian ( Although concerns about aggravating shock and "failure to rally" from chloroform appear to have disappeared in the years after the Crimean War, they resurfaced during the First World War . In a manual published in 1918, army surgeons were advised to avoid chloroform in septic cases requiring amputation "as it is often followed by a slow fall of blood pressure, which ends in death during the twelve hours succeeding operation".183 Gas and oxygen was recommended as the method of choice in such cases, though spinal anaesthesia, warm ether vapour and intravenous ether were regarded as comparatively safe alternatives.
Conclusions
At the start of the war British army surgeons had little experience of using anaesthesia in patients with gunshot wounds, and opinion was divided about the possible "depressive" effect of chloroform in such injuries. During the first three months of the war, chloroform was used in only 60 per cent of all amputations and in 66 per cent of major amputations. Lack of availability of chloroform, especially at regimental level and on transport ships, was probably the major reason for its low usage at this time; John Hall's caution against its use probably had only a limited impact and then only in divisions or regiments where the opinions of the senior medical officers concurred with his. During the second quarter of the war chloroform was used in 95 per cent of all amputations and 100 per cent of major amputations. At this time, during the winter months, there was little fighting and operations were few in number. Supplies of chloroform were obviously adequate for the relatively small demand, and medical staff had sufficient time to use anaesthesia. However, these considerations also applied during the last three months of the war, and the high rates of use during the first quarter of 1855 may also have been influenced by public reaction at home to the publication of Hall's memorandum and general concern about the plight of the British soldier in the Crimea.
After March 1855 the use of anaesthesia declined progressively, and by the end of the war was at the same level as it had been at the start. Low rates of usage at times of intense fighting, for example, during the final attack on the Malakoff and Redan redoubts in September 1855, may have resulted from temporary, local shortages of chloroform, even though total stocks were ample, and from pressure of work. However these considerations did not apply between October and December 1855, when the surgical workload was relatively light and there were no sudden peaks due to major military actions. Medical opinion and practice must have been the major determinants of chloroform usage at this time.
By the end of the war most surgeons no longer believed that chloroform had a "depressant" effect in shock, and some realized that, as Snow had predicted in 1847, the relief of pain had a positively beneficial effect in apparently poor risk patients, thereby permitting primary operations which carried lower mortality rates than delayed, secondary procedures. However, a significant minority, probably about a third of army surgeons, still considered that chloroform had a depressant effect which contributed to "failure to rally" from an operation; these surgeons were generally averse to using chloroform in amputations which carried a high mortality, such as those in the thigh. There was still considerable reluctance to use chloroform for minor operations where the injury itself posed no risk to life.
The official medical history of the war omitted all mention of quantitative data about the use of chloroform, and was phrased in such a way as to suggest that anaesthesia had been practised more widely than was the case. This probably reflects continuing sensitivity to the general criticisms to which the Army Medical Service had been subjected during the war, and also a reluctance to give information which might lead to a revival of public discussion about Hall's caution on the use of chloroform.
In contrast to American practice in the mid-nineteenth century, there is no known surviving evidence to suggest that British soldiers and sailors were less likely to receive anaesthesia than were civilian men. The British usage of anaesthesia during the Crimean War was similar to that in contemporary American civilian practice, though lower than that in the Russian army in the Crimea, and probably lower than in the French army.
In the years following the war, the use of anaesthesia by British army surgeons appears to have increased; by the mid-1870s military surgeons were officially advised to use chloroform whenever possible, and the stocks held at regimental and divisional levels had been increased two-to three-fold. The increase in the use of anaesthesia mirrored what was happening in civilian practice at this time.
